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225 
Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage 
Mary Anne Case  
It may at first seem odd to include enforceable bargains between 
parties to an ongoing marriage among traditionally forbidden areas of 
exchange. After all, the notion of a marriage market is familiar to 
readers of texts ranging from nineteenth century English novels to 
twenty-first century personals ads. Parties to a marriage are 
frequently urged to show one another the money. Exchange between 
them, far from being forbidden, is strongly encouraged. But, even as 
the laws governing marriage in the United States have moved farther 
along the spectrum from status to contract, marriage in the United 
States by and large remains subject to what Saul Levmore has dubbed 
the rule of ―love it or leave it.‖1 Courts in this country have generally 
been closed to those who seek judicial enforcement of bargains or 
judicial resolution of disputes in an ongoing marriage; married 
couples are instead usually ―limited to self-help, private negotiation, 
or the extreme step of dissolution.‖2  
Applying this rule to marriage is increasingly anomalous. Other 
areas of law once dominated by a love-it-or-leave-it norm, like the 
 
 
  I am grateful to commentator Bob Pollak and other participants in the Love or Money 
Symposium, particularly organizers Marion Crain and Kim Krawiec; to participants in 
workshops at Duke Law School, the University of Chicago Law School, and the American 
University Law School/Up Against Family Law Exceptionalism Conference on Framing 
Comparative Family Law; to June Carbone, Frank Easterbrook, Dirk Hartog, Ethan Leib, Laura 
Rosenbury, Andres Sawicki, Buffie Scott, Naomi Schoenbaum, Marc Spindelman, and Viviana 
Zelizer for comments on drafts; to Susan Appleton, Lisa Bernstein, Brian Bix, Michael Broyde, 
Liz Emens, Martha Fineman, Catherine Fisk, Mary Anne Franks, Sally Goldfarb, Nicole 
Goldstein, Havva Guney-Ruebenacker, Janet Halley, Dick Helmholtz, Emily Kadens, Julius 
Kirshner, Paul Mahoney, Sara McDougall, Todd Preuss, Jeff Redding, Ed Stein, Jeannie Suk, 
Melech Westreich, and John Witte for brainstorming assistance; and to Mishan Araujo, 
Lyonette Louis-Jacques, Deborah Megdal, Margaret Schilt, and Tara Tavernia for research 
assistance. All errors remain my own. 
 1. Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Exclusivity of 
Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 226 (1995). 
 2. Id. at 226. 
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law of business partnership,
3
 and the law governing supply contracts,
4
 
have evolved over time toward ―expansion of remedies and, in 
particular, the possibility of legal intervention in a continuing 
contractual relationship.‖5 At the same time, parties in forms of long-
term sexual relationship other than marriage, forms which U.S. law 
once put squarely within the category of forbidden exchange by 
denominating them meretricious (i.e., tantamount to illegal 
prostitution), found courts increasingly receptive to claims for 
enforcement of their bargains. In the leading case of Marvin v. 
Marvin, for example, the California Supreme Court held that 
courts should enforce express contracts between nonmarital 
partners except to the extent that the contract is explicitly 
founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services. 
. . . In the absence of an express contract, the courts should 
inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether 
that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of 
partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding 
between the parties.
6
  
At least in theory, married couples, too, are freer to make enforceable 
contracts with one another than once they were under U.S. law. 
Section 3(a)(8) of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act allows a 
couple to contract about ―any . . . matter, including their personal 
rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy.‖7 Still, a 
decade after Elizabeth and Robert Scott observed that ―[e]ven under 
the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, which seems to permit 
 
 3. Business partnerships are the central focus of Levmore‘s analysis. Id. at 221 (―The 
traditional rule in partnership law is that a claim for ‗final accounting‘ is a partner‘s exclusive 
remedy. Under this rule, withdrawal from a partnership must precede or accompany legal 
actions against one‘s partners.‖). 
 4. Id. at 249 (―There was a time when to bring a claim against one‘s supplier, for 
example, was to terminate the supply contract.‖). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976). Although the passage of so-called 
mini-DOMAs, or Defense of Marriage Acts, has complicated the analysis in several states, 
virtually all states now allow for some judicially enforceable contractual claims by one non-
marital cohabitant against another. See generally William A. Reppy, Jr., Choice of Law 
Problems Arising When Unmarried Cohabitants Change Domicile, 55 SMU L. REV. 273 
(2002).  
 7. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3, 9C U.L.A. 373 (1983). 
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contracting over intramarital issues, there is little evidence that courts 
are prepared to resolve any resulting disputes,
8
 I, Like the Scotts,  
remain ―unaware of any appellate opinions applying this section 
during marriage.‖9 Moreover, even though the comment to section 3 
states that ―an agreement may provide for such matters as the choice 
of abode, the freedom to pursue career opportunities, the upbringing 
of children, and so on,‖10 it remains true, as the Scotts observed, that 
―[s]tates that have adopted the Uniform Act . . . do not seem to 
enforce such contracts, and some have seemingly inconsistent 
statutory provisions.‖11  
The remainder of this Essay will use a variety of arguments to 
question what remains the presumption against availability of judicial 
enforcement for bargains between spouses in an ongoing marriage, 
first by explaining how McGuire v. McGuire,
12
 the leading case most 
often and reflexively cited to support this presumption, in fact offers 
no such support; then by weighing the relevant policy considerations; 
and by drawing analogies to the remedies available for other forms of 
relational contracts under U.S. law and to the remedies available to 
parties in an ongoing marriage in other legal systems. 
 
 8. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1225, 1303 (1998). 
 9. Id. at 1303 n.177. 
 10. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 cmt. 
 11. Scott & Scott, supra note 8, at 1303 n.177; see also id. (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 1620 (West 1994)) (―Except as otherwise provided by law, a husband and wife cannot, by a 
contract with each other, alter their legal relations, except as to property.‖). 
 12. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953). Those who approach the 
enforcement of bargains in an ongoing marriage by way of contract rather than family law may 
be more likely to begin with the British case of Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (holding 
unenforceable the commitment of a husband stationed in Ceylon to send £30 each month to his 
wife in England). Among the many reasons this Essay focuses on McGuire rather than Balfour 
are that Mrs. Balfour, unlike Mrs. McGuire, only sought judicial enforcement after her husband 
had proposed a permanent separation and that a Victorian marriage such as that of the Balfours 
was governed by legal rules and social norms even farther from those applicable in the United 
States today than was a mid-twentieth century middle American marriage such as that of the 
McGuires. 
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MCGUIRE IS A CASE ABOUT STATUS, NOT CONTRACT
13
 
Although cited in fewer than half a dozen other cases since it was 
decided in 1953, McGuire v. McGuire is discussed in well over one 
hundred law review articles and featured prominently in the 
overwhelming majority of family law casebooks published for the 
U.S. market. Among the propositions for which it is generally 
thought to stand is that a wife ―could not enforce any claims against 
her spouse during the course of the ongoing marriage.‖14  
The Nebraska Supreme Court‘s detailed recounting of the facts 
likely contributed to making the case a classic. According to the 
court, Lydia and Charles McGuire had been married for more than 
thirty years before she brought him to court.
15
 At the time of their 
marriage, he had been a bachelor farmer in his late forties with ―a 
reputation for more than ordinary frugality,‖ and she had been a 
widow in her thirties with two daughters.
16
 Until a few years before 
the litigation, Lydia, in addition to doing chores on her husband‘s 
farm and performing household duties, had earned her own money 
from raising chickens.
17
 She used the money ―to buy clothing, things 
she wanted, and for groceries,‖18 but a deterioration in her health had 
forced her to give up her poultry and egg business,
19
 leaving her with 
a small bank account of approximately $1,500 in her own name as 
well as some rent money from her late husband‘s farm, her interest in 
which she had transferred to her daughters.
20
 Her husband, by 
contrast, had in his name bank deposits and government bonds 
totaling more than $100,000, as well as nearly four hundred acres of 
land.
21
 Lydia described herself as ―a dutiful and obedient wife‖ and 
her husband as ―the boss of the house . . . [whose] word was law . . . 
 
 13. My analysis here is inspired by the chapter on McGuire in HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN & 
WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 6–39 (2000). 
 14. Ellen Wright Clayton & Jay Clayton, Afterword: Voices and Violence—A Dialogue, 
43 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1815 (1990). 
 15. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d at 342.  
 16. Id. at 337. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 338. 
 20. Id. at 337–38. 
 21. Id. at 338. 
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[who] would not tolerate any charge accounts and would not inform 
her as to his finances or business; . . . a poor companion.‖22 She 
acknowledged that he had paid for groceries, kitchen flooring, a 
combination stove, and her three abdominal operations.
23
 But she 
complained that their house had no indoor plumbing, their 1929 Ford 
had a bad heater, and her husband provided her with very little cash; 
no new clothes, furniture, or silverware; not even tickets to a motion 
picture show, membership fees for charitable institutions, or the 
ability freely to make long distance telephone calls.
24
 The trial court 
had ordered him to remedy these deficiencies, making his credit 
available to her and obligating him to pay for several thousand 
dollars worth of household improvements, a new car, his wife‘s 
annual travel expenses to visit her daughters, and a monthly $50 
personal allowance for his wife.
25
 The Nebraska Supreme Court 
reversed, noting that ―the marital relation has continued for more than 
33 years, and the wife has been supported in the same manner during 
this time without complaint.‖26 It held that ―to maintain an action 
such as the one at bar, the parties must be separated or living apart 
from each other.‖27 According to the Nebraska Supreme Court: 
The living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the 
household, and not for the courts to determine, even though the 
husband‘s attitude toward his wife, according to his wealth and 
circumstances, leaves little to be said in his behalf.
28
 
It does appear that the court is telling Lydia McGuire she must love 
her marriage or leave it: only if she is willing at least to separate from 
her husband, if not also to divorce him, will the court allow her to 
enforce her legal rights against him.
29
 
 
 22. Id. at 337. 
 23. Id. at 337–38. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at 343. 
 26. Id. at 342. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.  
 29. In point of fact, she never did separate from him, perhaps because, while the appeal of 
the case was pending, her husband had indeed made the improvements ordered by the lower 
court. Charles McDermott, attorney for Mr. McGuire, reports that, in his view, the McGuires: 
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Those who continue to cite McGuire for the proposition that a 
court will not enforce a bargain between spouses in an ongoing 
marriage should look much more closely at the holding in both its 
specific factual context and its general legal context, however. There 
was no suggestion in the case that the McGuires ever had any kind of 
bargain or contract between them, other than the contract for their 
entry into the status of marriage as it was then defined by the law of 
Nebraska. Therefore, when the court insists that ―[t]he living 
standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and 
not for the courts to determine,‖30 it is repudiating enforcement of a 
thick vision of status and has not necessarily said anything at all 
repudiating the enforceability of any explicit, or even implied, 
agreement between spouses.  
On the facts as presented, such evidence as a court might use to 
find an implied agreement does not favor Lydia McGuire‘s claim. As 
the court noted, she had acquiesced for three decades ―without 
complaint‖31 in the household‘s prior level of expenditures and her 
longstanding pattern and practice had been to use her own money (of 
which admittedly there was less in recent years due to the cessation 
of her poultry business) to purchase items she now claimed her 
husband should be ordered to furnish her.
32
 Precisely in the absence 
of an express contractual understanding between the McGuires as to 
their standard of living or level of expenditure and in the face of their 
longstanding contrary pattern and practice, for the court to choose 
Lydia‘s over Charles‘s view as to household living standards would 
 
were very much alike, both being very cautious when it came to money. . . . They 
never did separate, but continued to live together as husband and wife until Mr. 
McGuire‘s death. . . . They would come together in their old Model A car during the 
winter with no heater to the Courthouse. . . . After the hearings they would 
immediately get in their car and go home. 
 Incidentally, while the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Mr. McGuire did 
comply with the District Court‘s orders and bought a used car with a heater and made 
some payments to her and . . . modernized the farm home, all of which he resented 
doing. 
Letter from Charles McDermott, Attorney for Mr. McGuire (Apr. 18, 1977), reprinted in Judith 
Areen & Milton C. Regan, Jr., Family Law: Cases and Materials 150–51 (5th ed. 2006). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 342.  
 32. Id. at 338–42. 
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be indeed for a court to dictate to them, rather than leaving it to the 
McGuires themselves to determine. 
One way to make this clearer is by comparing McGuire to other 
cases in which couples ended up in court because of a dispute about 
their family‘s living standards. Underlying many of these cases is the 
doctrine of necessaries, which at common law made a husband liable 
for items such as food, clothing, household items and essential 
services furnished to his wife, who while under coverture had limited 
ability to contract in her own name. Consider first, by way of contrast 
to McGuire, the 1980 Wisconsin case of Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. 
Buckstaff.
33
 Mrs. Buckstaff, a housewife married to a husband with a 
―substantial income‖34 and whose ―family is one of social and 
economic prominence in the Oshkosh area,‖35 placed a special order 
with the plaintiff for a sofa, which was delivered to and remained at 
the time of litigation in the Buckstaff family home.
36
 Mr. Buckstaff, 
however, declined to pay for the sofa, claiming not only a lack of the 
traditionally required evidence that he had failed or refused to 
provide a sofa for his wife but also ―that the necessaries doctrine 
conflicts with contemporary trends toward equality of the sexes and a 
sex neutral society.‖37 The majority opinion not only reaffirmed that 
―in the absence of an express contract to the contrary, . . . a husband 
incurs the primary obligation, implied as a matter of law, to assume 
liability for the necessaries which have been procured for the 
sustenance of his family‖38 but also declared that the ―Buckstaffs are 
a prominent family and their socio-economic standing justifies a 
finding that the sofa at issue here was a suitable and proper item for 
their household.‖39 
Mrs. Buckstaff was prepared to do what Mrs. McGuire apparently 
was not—to order merchandise on credit without her husband‘s or the 
court‘s prior approval.40 She was less at risk than Mrs. McGuire in so 
 
 33. Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 219 (Wis. 1980). 
 34. Id. at 221.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 220–21. 
 37. Id. at 222–23. 
 38. Id. at 222. 
 39. Id. at 224. 
 40. Indeed, in the Buckstaff case, the husband had already advised the local credit bureau 
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doing because, unlike Mrs. McGuire, she apparently had no income 
or assets of her own from which her creditors could demand payment. 
But the Wisconsin Supreme Court was also prepared to do what the 
Nebraska Supreme Court was not: to determine the appropriate 
―living standards of a family‖41 based on its wealth and social 
position, perhaps because the court‘s task was limited to approving, 
not the remodeling and refurbishing of an entire house, but a single 
discrete purchase not expressly rejected—indeed apparently already 
used—by the husband asked to pay for it.  
In other cases which like McGuire involve broad areas of 
disagreement, courts regularly declined to intervene, in large part 
because of an aversion to micromanagement of a couple‘s spending 
decisions. The disagreements between Paul and Kathryn George, for 
which she sought judicial resolution, included, for example, whether 
to shop on an installment plan or pay bills promptly, whether to shop 
at Kroger‘s or another store, and whether he or she ―should control 
the expenditure of funds.‖42 Describing this as a case involving, not 
husbandly neglect (given that Mrs. George herself testified, ―[w]e 
live very nice‖),43 but ―conflicting concepts of family financial 
management,‖44 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, like that of 
Nebraska in McGuire, declined to intervene, saying that the criminal 
neglect statute under which Mrs. George had prosecuted her case 
―was never intended to constitute a court a sounding board for 
domestic financial disagreements, nor a board of arbitration to 
determine the extent to which a husband is required to recognize the 
budget suggested by the wife or her demands for control over the 
purse strings.‖45 
Put this way, the American court system‘s repudiation of 
intervention in the budgeting decisions of a couple in an ongoing 
marriage bears some resemblance to its repudiation of comparable 
worth in the enforcement of employment discrimination laws. In both 
 
service (but apparently not Sharpe Furniture) ―that he would not be responsible for any credit 
extended to his wife.‖ Id. at 220. 
 41. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953). 
 42. Commonwealth v. George, 56 A.2d 228, 229 (Pa. 1948). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 230. 
 45. Id. at 231. 
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instances, a concern over micromanaging influences the decision not 
to intervene. Just as the laws governing marital support were, 
according to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, ―never intended to 
constitute a court a sounding board for domestic financial 
disagreements, nor a board of arbitration‖ over household budgeting 
decisions,
46
 so, for example, the Seventh Circuit has insisted that the 
Equal Pay Act 
does not authorize federal courts to set their own standards of 
―acceptable‖ business practices . . . [or] to serve as personnel 
managers for America‘s employers. As we say frequently 
when dealing with equivalent questions under other federal 
statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: ―A 
district judge does not sit in a court of industrial relations. No 
matter how medieval a firm‘s practices, no matter how high-
handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the 
firm‘s managers, Title VII and § 1981 do not interfere.‖47 
Courts in the United States tell women dissatisfied with the 
prevailing wages in pink collar jobs approximately what they tell 
wives dissatisfied with their husbands‘ level of expenditure on the 
household—love it or leave it.48 If your pink collar job, or your 
marital household, as currently structured and compensated, doesn‘t 
suit you, find another sort of job or another household. This is 
especially easy for the court to say at a time when there are no 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Wernsing v. Dep‘t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations 
omitted). I am not suggesting that comparable worth litigation is in all respects analogous to 
litigation about an ongoing marriage, however. As Frank Easterbrook was quite right to remind 
me, in the comparable worth context, unlike the marital bargain context, courts are perfectly 
willing to enforce the contract between the parties; indeed, they insist on enforcing it rather than 
rewriting it. 
 48. Other judicial systems are more willing to intervene to adjudicate both claims of 
comparable worth and disputes in an ongoing marriage. As will be discussed infra, even in the 
Middle Ages courts in continental Europe adjudicated claims in an ongoing marriage. And for 
the last several decades, the European Union has interpreted its equal pay guarantee to 
encompass adjudication of whether work is of comparable worth. See, e.g., Case 61/81, 
Comm‘n v. U.K., 1982 E.C.R. 2601 (holding that because EU law guarantees men and women 
the ―right to equal pay for work of equal value,‖ member states must provide a forum in which 
a worker can have adjudicated a claim that his or her ―work has the same value as other work‖). 
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remaining formal legal hurdles either to divorce or to women‘s entry 
into blue and white collar jobs previously reserved to men.  
The general effect of combining this absence of remaining legal 
obstacles to exit with an absence of strong judicial intervention in the 
relationship is all too often to leave the gendered power imbalance 
untouched but obscured. In the world of employment, without the 
intervention of enforcement of comparable worth, jobs in which 
women predominate (including those jobs to which women were 
once limited) tend to remain underpaid and undervalued in 
comparison to jobs predominantly held by men. And, especially 
when they take those larger earnings home, many husbands will still, 
like Charles McGuire, hold the whip hand over the living standards 
of their family by virtue of their superior economic power, if no 
longer by legal prerogative of sex. 
It is important, however, to remember that the legally enforced 
regime of married women‘s subordination under coverture helped 
create and justify the Anglo-American rule that courts would decline 
to intervene in an ongoing marriage even to enforce an explicit 
bargain between husband and wife. As Blackstone famously 
described it in the late eighteenth century: 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that 
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended 
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband: . . . and her condition 
during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this 
principle, of an union of person in husband and wife, depend 
almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of 
them acquire by the marriage. . . . For this reason, a man 
cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into covenant with 
her: for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence; 
and to covenant with her, would be only to covenant with 
himself: and therefore it is also generally true, that all 
compacts made between husband and wife, when single, are 
voided by the intermarriage.
49
 
 
 49. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430. 
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Not only could a married woman not make a contract with her 
husband, but also her ability to bargain with the outside world was 
severely restricted by coverture, in which rights over her property and 
the wages she had earned vested in her husband.
50
 In addition to 
precluding husband and wife from making enforceable contracts with 
one another about such matters as the level of household 
expenditures, the status law of marriage under coverture also had a 
simple way of resolving any disputes: he wins. By law, the husband 
had the right to determine where and how the couple would live. 
Even as changes in the law during the period from the mid-nineteenth 
century to McGuire gave married women increasing rights over 
property, it was not until 1981 that the U.S. Supreme Court finally 
struck down as an unconstitutional violation of equal protection on 
grounds of sex a ―statute that gave a husband, as ‗head and master‘ of 
property jointly owned with his wife, the unilateral right to dispose of 
such property without his spouse‘s consent.‖51 
Arguments similar to those used today to object to any 
enforcement of bargains in an ongoing marriage were in the past used 
to argue against amending the law to increase the liberty and equality 
of wives in marriage. Thus, noted nineteenth century treatise writer 
Joel Prentiss Bishop, as part of an argument against law reform 
proposals that would have ―the law of partnership . . . extended to 
husband and wife, thus making the two equal, and burying the 
supposed superior rights of the husband‖52 or would have allowed 
―husband and wife to pass through their married lives absolutely 
independent of each other in respect of property‖53 raised the 
following ―insurmountable‖ difficulties with the latter proposal: 
If the wife spends an afternoon in visiting her mother instead 
of making jellies, shall the husband bring her into court to 
determine the abatement to be made from the sum he had 
 
 50. See, e.g., CAROLINE NORTON, ENGLISH LAWS FOR WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY (Hyperion Press, 1981) (1854) (1854 polemic influential in reforming the laws of 
Britain written by wife whose husband had seized her earnings and her children after 
unsuccessful divorce action).  
 51. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981). 
 52. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 398 (Marion C. 
Early ed., 2d ed. 1907) (1887). 
 53. Id. at 399. 
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promised her for work in keeping his boarding-house? Shall 
there be a lawsuit to settle the allowance for tending the baby 
which is partly his and partly hers? If her washing is sent to a 
laundress, and her clothes had been soiled in part in doing his 
work and in part in doing her own, and in part in tending the 
baby of both, shall the judge of a court be employed in 
instructing the jury how to adjust the account between them?
54
 
The transformation of the argument for non-interference in the 
financial arrangements of couples in an ongoing marriage can be seen 
as an example of what Reva Siegel has called ―preservation through 
transformation.‖55 She first illustrated this ―modernization dynamic‖ 
by demonstrating how the justification for courts‘ reluctance to 
intervene in cases of wife beating transformed over time ―in rule 
structure and rationale from a law of marital prerogative to a law of 
marital privacy.‖56 
Marital privacy has also over time been used as a justification, not 
only for courts‘ reluctance to intervene in an intact marriage without 
a prior explicit agreement between the spouses that can guide 
resolution of the disagreement (apparently the situation in McGuire), 
but even for a court‘s refusal to enforce a fully negotiated agreement 
between divorcing spouses.
57
 
OTHER RELATIONAL CONTRACTS CAN BE ENFORCED DURING AN 
ONGOING RELATIONSHIP 
With respect to enforceable bargains between parties to a sexual 
relationship, including marriage and meretricious relationships in 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. Reva B. Siegel, ―The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Mentry v. Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260, 268 (1983) (declining to enforce 
agreement concerning children‘s exposure to non-custodial parent‘s religion reached by 
divorcing spouses under supervision of family conciliation court because ―considerations of 
family privacy and parental autonomy should continue to constrain the exercise of judicial 
authority despite the fact that the family is no longer intact; indeed, such considerations more 
often than not gain force because the family is no longer intact‖). 
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both the old-fashioned and the newfangled (Washington state law)
58
 
sense, subsidiary questions follow from the general question: Why no 
enforcement in an ongoing relationship? If employers and employees, 
athletes and their teams, and stars and their studios can go to 
arbitration over terms without having the relationship necessarily end 
through what Saul Levmore called ―love it or leave it,‖ why not 
spouses? The argument that courts will be cluttered with claims about 
who does the dishes has never stopped agreements between mere 
roommates from being enforceable in principle before one of them 
moves out. Why, as Fran Olsen asked years ago, can sex itself not be 
one of the things couples bargain over?
59
 And why is contracting by 
married couples so often seen as necessarily a weakening of bonds, 
rather than an opening up of the possibility of strengthening them by, 
for example, allowing the conventional wedding promises (for better, 
for worse . . .) to be enforceable with expectation damages?  
Additionally, what the amount in controversy is, even in an 
apparently trivial dispute, really depends on the parties involved. It 
may not seem like a big deal that Charlize Theron wore one brand 
name watch rather than another to an awards show, but in light of her 
$3 million contract with one design firm, it was, so they sued.
60
 If her 
agreement had been with her husband, for example, that she would 
not wear jewelry he had not given her, what result? What if her 
husband were a jewelry designer? 
Among merchants in ongoing contractual relationships, as Lisa 
Bernstein has documented, the ability to submit disputes such as 
those about the quality of a particular shipment of goods ―to a neutral 
tribunal at a low cost and to obtain a quick ruling on the subject 
 
 58. Although the term ―meretricious relationship,‖ derived from ―meretrix,‖ the Latin for 
prostitute, was long used to refer to something in the nature of prostitution, the courts of 
Washington state began in the late twentieth century to use it in a way not intended to be 
pejorative to describe non-marital ―committed intimate relationships‖ to which they were 
prepared to give some legal recognition under state law. See Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 778 
P.2d 1022 (Wa. 1989) (acknowledging the pejorative history of the term ―meretricious‖ but 
failing to find an adequate substitute); Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 350 (2007) (substituting 
the term ―law of committed intimate relationships‖ for what had previously been known as 
Washington‘s ―meretricious relationship doctrine‖). 
 59. See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 835 (1985). 
 60. Weil v. Theron, 585 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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without filing a claim for breach can play an important role in 
preventing contractual relationships from unraveling.‖61 Might not 
those in a marital relationship similarly benefit from an opportunity 
to hive off a discrete disputed question for definitive resolution 
without being limited to the alternatives of festering unresolved 
disagreement or divorce?
62
 
As contracts scholar Banks McDowell argued nearly a half 
century ago, parties to a marital bargain 
ought not to and may not regard the court as an intermeddler in 
their private fight, but rather as an impartial referee whose 
decision must be accepted as the fair and equitable resolution 
of their controversy. Enforcement of the agreement may well 
remove a bone of contention among the parties, whereas 
refusal merely lets the dissatisfaction fester.
63 
McDowell‘s ―conclusion from the above analysis is not that the 
courts ought to automatically start enforcing such agreements, but it 
is ground for taking a new look at the problems.‖64 He went on to 
analyze three kinds of agreements between spouses in an ongoing 
marriage and the circumstances under which they should be judicially 
enforceable: ―reconciliation agreements,‖ which he said had ―been 
effectively used to improve troubled marriages by the Conciliation 
Court in Los Angeles‖;65 ―adjustment of obligations agreements,‖ in 
which ―parties to a marriage . . . not in serious trouble . . . merely 
want to make more definite some general obligation or to vary some 
duty imposed by law on the marital relationship,‖ which he argued 
should be enforced so long as they did not ―represent an attempt to 
avoid marital duties‖ or ―destroy the flexibility necessary for 
adjustment as the position of the spouses changes‖;66 and agreements 
 
 61. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1774 (2001). 
 62. There is at least some possibility that this is what happened with the McGuires, given 
that according to his attorney, she obtained much of what she had sued for while the appeal was 
pending, he obtained vindication on appeal, and the two remained together until his death. See 
Letter from Charles McDermott, supra note 29. 
 63. Banks McDowell, Contracts in the Family, 45 B.U. L. REV. 43, 52 (1965). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 53. 
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for performance of marital obligations ―above and beyond the call of 
duty,‖ which were bargains intended ―to induce performance of [a 
marital] duty‖ such as caring for a sick spouse ―in an exceptional‖ 
rather than ―perfunctory manner,‖ to arrange compensation for ―an 
extraordinary service which is a great and largely unanticipated 
burden on the promisee.‖67 
Corporations, including closely held corporations, also habitually  
[a]llow[] a participant (shareholder) to bring suits, based on 
fault or contractual agreement, against fiduciaries or the 
ongoing enterprise. Because courts rarely go so far as to 
dissolve corporations, one might think of there being an 
exclusivity rule of the opposite kind in this arena: ―Litigate but 
do not leave it.‖68 
Given the strong analytical and historical points of similarity between 
the development of the Anglo-American laws governing marriage 
and those governing business corporations (which I have explored at 
length in other work),
69
 the law of marriage‘s strong divergence from 
corporate law is particularly noteworthy. 
OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS HAVE LONG ALLOWED FOR ENFORCEMENT 
IN AN ONGOING MARRIAGE 
The inability to obtain enforcement in an ongoing marriage is far 
from a universal feature of the law of marriage in all legal systems at 
all times. For example, Montesquieu declared at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century that, in France, ―husbands have only a vestige of 
authority over wives,‖ because ―the law intervenes in every dispute 
between them.‖70 Indeed, historians of late medieval and early 
 
 67. Id. at 53–54. But see Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(declining to enforce due to lack of consideration an agreement that wife would, in exchange 
for an interest in certain of her husband‘s property she had previously renounced in a prenuptial 
agreement, personally nurse her sick husband at home rather than arrange for professional care). 
 68. Levmore, supra note 2, at 229. 
 69. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1777–84 
(2005). 
 70. Sarah Hanley, Social Sites of Political Practice in France: Lawsuits, Civil Rights, and 
the Separation of Powers in Domestic and State Government, 1500-1800, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 
27, 40 (1997) (quoting CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, PERSIAN 
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modern France and Italy provide evidence of a pattern of judicial 
enforcement of women‘s rights within an ongoing marriage that 
seems to resemble the U.S. corporate law norm: 
 For women, property separations emerged as a more viable 
option than separations of person and property. The relative 
ease with which property separations were granted provided 
married women with the leverage to counter, whether by threat 
or by actual petition, the legal privileges their husbands had 
over marital property and to check other kinds of behavior than 
the narrow management of property.  
. . . [In litigated cases, h]usbands‘ competence was questioned 
rather than assumed; indeed, some women in these cases . . . 
were able to use separation petitions to reshape the political 
economies of their households to protect their own interests if 
their husbands came up short. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . For the state as represented by its judges, for the local 
community, and for kin anxious to protect their lineage 
property, separations were a means of disciplining and 
regulating households. But all three parties sought to limit the 
disruption by trying to reconcile husbands and wives and by 
favoring property separations as checks on the internal 
problems of households over the disintegration of households 
that separations of person and property entailed.
71
 
Perhaps one reason why continental judges were more willing than 
their English contemporaries to follow what became the modern rule 
for corporations is that continental marriages, particularly among the 
urban bourgeoisie, resembled closely held corporations more than did 
those of the English landed gentry. Women in intact marriages in 
early modern France, for example, had their own capital in the form 
of lineage property, and the level of detailed judicial decision making 
 
LETTERS (Christopher J. Betts ed. & trans., Penguin Books 1973) (1721)).  
 71. Julie Hardwick, Seeking Separations: Gender, Marriages, and Household Economies 
in Early Modern France, 21 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 157, 179–80 (1998). 
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required to vest control of such property in a wife was far less than 
the micromanagement inevitably involved in determining, for 
example, the appropriate living standards of the McGuire household. 
―In England, by contrast, where there was no lineage property, there 
was also no common-law right to separate property and no separate 
property agreement until the nineteenth century, and separate 
domicile was easier for women to obtain than separate property.‖72 
The historians‘ evidence suggests that bargaining in the shadow of 
possible judicial enforcement—as the modern law and economics 
literature would predict—strengthened the hand of women in 
continental Europe negotiating with recalcitrant husbands, not only 
over property issues such as household expenditures and 
investments,
73
 but also when it came to matters such as domestic 
violence. For example, in her study of separated couples in 
fourteenth-century Venice, historian Linda Guzzetti describes cases 
settled before judicial proceedings were brought, in which: 
it was a question of the husband undertaking, for the future, 
neither to beat his wife, nor to abuse her, but to treat her well. 
The promises were made with the aim that the wives accept 
living again with the husbands from whom they had fled. 
These reconciliation agreements contained formulas similar to 
those in all other notarial contracts: for non-fulfilment of 
promise a financial penalty was envisaged, and each party 
could take the other to court.
74
 
 
 72. Id. at 175. A French woman‘s remedies were not necessarily limited to asserting 
control only over the property she brought to the marriage, however. Judges could also order 
her to receive ―a yearly maintenance sum from her husband.‖ Id. at 161. ―A late-seventeenth-
century commentator noted that ‗the husband must only be deemed the Master of the 
Community [property] when he makes good use of it‘ and that in Burgundy, as in other 
customary-law regimes, failure to manage property well opened the door to a petition for 
separate property.‖ Id. at 160 (alteration in original).  
 73. The threat of litigation could work both ways. While granting a wife her separate 
property could protect household assets from creditors, the publicity accorded her petition could 
also signal to creditors the financial precariousness of the household. More than one French 
husband whose wife sued for a separation ―on the grounds of his poor husbandry and 
mistreatment of her . . . called her claims slanderous and not only opposed the petition but 
asked that she pay him compensatory damages.‖ Id. at 172.  
 74. Linda Guzzetti, Separations and Separated Couples in Fourteenth-century Venice, in 
MARRIAGE IN ITALY, 1300-1650, at 249, 257 (Trevor Dean & K.J.P. Lowe eds., 1998) 
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Whereas differences in marital property regimes between England 
and the continent may help account for the comparative willingness 
of courts in early modern continental Europe to enforce bargains in 
an ongoing marriage, the fact that their approach to marriage is more 
thoroughgoingly contractual and juridical may help explain why 
Jewish and Islamic legal systems have also long been more willing to 
enforce bargains in an ongoing marriage than the Anglo-American 
legal system, whose approach to civil marriage evolved from 
Christian canonical notions of marriage as a sacrament of union.  
According to Elimelech Westreich, the McGuire case would have 
been decided very differently under Jewish law: ―The living 
standards are definitely a matter for the courts to determine. [This] is 
accepted without reservations by the Misnah, Talmud, Mishneh 
Torah, Sefer Ha-Turim, Shulchan Aruch, and in other Jewish law 
sources including the verdicts of the rabbinical courts of Israel.‖75 
In the Mishneh Torah, Maimonedes spells out at length what sort 
of food, dwelling, household objects, clothing, even ornaments and 
laundry money a husband must provide for his wife, specifying that a 
rich man must provide far more and of better quality than a poor one 
and mandating divorce only if a husband lacks the means to provide 
his wife even what a poor man‘s wife is entitled to.76 More generally, 
the Mishneh Torah not only sets forth the obligations of husbands 
and wives, but describes which of them can be altered or abrogated 
by agreement between the parties and exactly how they can be 
judicially adjudicated and enforced in an ongoing marriage.
77 
 
(footnote omitted).  
 75. E-mail from Elimelech Westreich, Professor of Jewish Family Law, Tel Aviv Univ., 
to Mary Anne Case, Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, Univ. of Chicago Law Sch. (Jan. 2, 
2009) (on file with author). 
 76. See MAIMONIDES, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH), BOOK OF JUDGES, 
LAWS OF THE SANHEDRIN, ch. 21, at 10–22 (Yale Univ. Press, Julian Obermann et al. eds., 
Abraham M. Hershman trans., 1977). 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 10 (―Whenever a woman refrains from performing any of the tasks that 
she is obligated to perform, she may be compelled to do so, even with a rod. When a husband 
complains that [his wife] does not perform [her required tasks], and [the wife] claims that she 
does, [the dispute should be clarified by having] a [neutral] woman dwell with them or [by 
asking] the neighbors. The judges should clarify the matter in the best way they see fit.‖). 
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Consider the following report of a dispute in an ongoing marriage 
adjudicated under Jewish law more than seventeen hundred years 
ago:  
A man may marry a woman on the condition that he not be 
responsible for her sustenance and financial support. 
Moreover, he may mandate that she be responsible for his 
sustenance and financial support and Torah study. An 
exemplary tale [ma‗aseh]: Yehoshua the son of R. Akiba 
married a woman and agreed with her that she be responsible 
to support him and his Torah study. There were years of 
drought, and they began to dispute. She began to complain 
about him to the sages, but when he came to the courthouse he 
said to them, ―[S]he is more trustworthy in my eyes than 
anyone.‖ She said to them, ―Indeed, he did posit that 
condition.‖ The sages said to her: ―There can be no changes 
after the ratification.‖78  
ENFORCING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDERS IN AN 
ONGOING RELATIONSHIP 
Unfortunately, the laws of early modern Venice may have been 
more conducive to obtaining protection against domestic violence in 
an ongoing relationship than those of many U.S. jurisdictions today. 
Scholars with practical experience as well as theoretical insight into 
the rules governing domestic violence protective orders, such as Sally 
Goldfarb, have criticized the fact that ―remedies for domestic 
violence too often protect a woman‘s right to safety only if she is 
willing to leave her partner, thereby sacrificing her right of autonomy 
as expressed through her decision to stay in an intimate 
relationship.‖79 They note that the overwhelming majority of 
protective orders issued are 
 
 78. Azzan Yadin, Rabbi Akiva’s Youth, 100 JEWISH Q. REV. 573, 583 (2010) (quoting 
Tosefta Ketubot 4.7). 
 79. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can 
Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1489 
(2008). 
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―stay-away‖ orders, which are designed to protect the victim 
by ending her relationship with the abuser. . . . However, there 
is another type of civil protection order for domestic violence, 
one that is currently prohibited in some jurisdictions, 
underutilized in others, and largely ignored in discussions of 
domestic violence law. Unlike a stay-away order, these orders 
prohibit future abuse but permit ongoing contact between the 
parties. Protection orders permitting ongoing contact are a 
valuable option for many women who are unwilling to leave 
their relationships and therefore would not seek a stay-away 
order. By customizing each order to express the victim‘s 
preferences for how much and what kinds of contact should be 
allowed, these orders can put the force of law behind the 
individual woman‘s choices.80 
I know from personal experience that the relationship-ending legal 
character of a criminal order of protection, in an instance of what 
Janet Halley has dubbed family law exceptionalism,
81
 does not 
extend to relationships that are not domestic or sexual. In the spring 
of 2000, I received a criminal order of protection against a tenant in 
my Manhattan building who had credibly threatened to kill me and to 
burn down the building. Although the tenant had already carried out 
threats to damage my property, I was nevertheless advised by 
landlord-tenant counsel that not only could I not terminate this 
tenant‘s lease but I might also even be compelled to offer him a 
renewal lease under the Rent Stabilization laws. Had my legal 
relationship with this threatening individual been that of husband and 
wife, not landlord and tenant, I could have had him thrown out of my 
house.
82
 
Intimate domestic violence has taken on a love-it-or–leave-it 
character, which Jeannie Suk has dubbed ―‗state-imposed de facto 
divorce,‘ wherein prosecutors use the routine enforcement of 
 
 80. Id. at 1489–90 (footnotes omitted). 
 81. See, e.g., Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family 
Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 753 (2010). 
 82. He did leave the building several months later, as a condition of a plea bargain 
negotiated by the Manhattan District Attorney‘s Office. 
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misdemeanor [domestic violence] to seek to end (in all but name) 
intimate domestic relationships.‖83 
THE POSSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF MARITAL 
BARGAINS CAN ACT AS A BRAKE RATHER THAN A SPUR TO 
BARGAINS THAT ARE GROSSLY UNEQUAL OR OTHERWISE 
CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY 
Just because bargains between a married couple cannot be 
enforced in court does not mean they will not be made. As Lawrence 
Stone documents, married couples in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century England who could not or did not seek judicial separation 
nevertheless formulated with the aid of lawyers highly detailed 
written contracts of separation. These contracts often contained 
clauses detailing not only their financial arrangements but also a 
more or less explicit assurance that the husband would not charge his 
wife with adultery even if she co-habited with another man after 
separation, despite the courts‘ repeated denial of the validity of such 
clauses and some difference of opinion about the enforceability of 
private separation agreements more generally.
84
 More recently, the 
New York Times reported increasingly frequent requests of 
matrimonial lawyers that ―no-child provisions‖ be included in pre-
nuptial agreements entered into between older wealthy men and their 
younger second wives, making it a condition of marriage that the 
couple have no children.
85
 
That such agreements would be deemed void as against public 
policy does not, as a practical matter, affect those who without 
judicial coercion fully perform them. At the most extreme, even the 
Thirteenth Amendment injunction that ―[n]either slavery nor 
involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States,‖86 one 
of the very rare U.S. constitutional prohibitions without a state action 
limitation, does not prevent couples in the United States from living 
 
 83. Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2006). 
 84. LAWRENCE STONE, THE ROAD TO DIVORCE: A HISTORY OF THE MAKING AND 
BREAKING OF MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1530–1937, at 163 (1990).  
 85. Jill Brooke, A Promise to Love, Honor and Bear No Children, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2002, § 9, at 1. 
 86. U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 1.  
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in what the BDSM community calls 24/7 Master/Slave relationships, 
in which the slave contracts to do the master‘s will without limit, 
reservation, or question.
87
 
On the rare occasions when similar bargains are brought into 
court, they are not well received. For example, while an appellate 
court majority opinion was content simply to affirm the trial court‘s 
refusal to enforce the provisions of marital and separation agreements 
in which Yvonne Spires made a commitment to submit herself 
completely to her husband Myles and to grant him sole custody and 
property rights in the event of breach, concurring Judge Frank 
Schwelb felt the need to append the full text of the agreement to 
provide readers of the opinion ―a striking example of the lengths to 
which some men would go to formalize the absurd and to exalt to 
contractual status their petty domestic tyranny.‖88 As Judge Schwelb 
explained: 
 Although, unfortunately, some men abuse, oppress and 
humiliate their wives, it is surely rare for a husband not only to 
reduce to writing an instrument requiring total subordination 
by the wife to the husband‘s caprice, but also to require his 
unfortunate spouse to sign it. I find it even more remarkable 
that a husband who has contrived to secure his wife‘s formal 
written assent to the husband‘s assertion of supremacy would 
then have the temerity to ask a court to enforce such an 
oppressive document according to its terms.  
 In my opinion, a ―contract‖ such as the one between these 
parties, which formalizes and seeks to legitimize absolute male 
domination and female subordination within the marital 
relationship, is against the public policy of this jurisdiction. It 
may not be enforced in our courts, nor can it be permitted to 
 
 87. See, e.g., PAT CALIFIA, PUBLIC SEX: THE CULTURE OF RADICAL SEX 241 (2d ed. 
2000) (―Of course, some S/M couples (or triads or other polygons) do try to maintain their 
erotic roles one hundred percent of the time, and they usually sign a written contract. It works 
best when some time is spent discussing the content of the document and when it is individually 
tailored to a particular relationship.‖); F.R.R. Mallory, 24/7, HOUSE OF DESADE, 
http://www.houseofdesade.com/articles/247.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010); F.R.R. Mallory, 
Submissive vs. Slave, HOUSE OF DESADE, http://www.houseofdesade.com/articles/subvsslave. 
htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
 88. Spires v. Spires, 743 A.2d 186, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Schweib, J., concurring). 
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affect adversely the rights of the oppressed wife or her 
children. . . .  
. . . It reflects a view of the relationship between the sexes that 
should have been consigned long ago to well-deserved 
oblivion. Under the law, the parties‘ now-defunct marriage 
made Mrs. Spires her former husband‘s partner, not his slave.89  
The Spires case was drawn to my attention by scholars of family law 
who urged me, in effect, to be careful what I wished for when I spoke 
in favor of judicially enforceable bargains in an ongoing marriage. 
Although it may seem like a paradox, I think the case actually helps 
demonstrate why courts are indeed an appropriate forum, far better 
than many alternatives, to deal with bargains such as the Spires‘ 
―Marital Agreement.‖ This is because, if the ordinary courts are 
closed to couples in an ongoing marriage, they will have an increased 
need to look elsewhere if they wish an arbiter for their ongoing 
disputes rather than a separation or divorce. As Saul Levmore 
observed: 
[I]t is precisely in the area of domestic relations, where the 
love-it-or-leave-it rule is most robust, that a substantial 
industry of counseling and mediation has arisen. Private parties 
can be said to react to the mandatory love-it-or-leave-it rule by 
―litigating‖ in the shadow of the courthouse and turning to 
pastors, psychologists, and other counselors. The demand for 
these nonjudicial services might be regarded as a clamor for a 
liability remedy where none is offered by law.
90
 
Eric Rasmusen and Jeffrey Evans Stake have even argued that ―[t]he 
turn to restrictive religions can be seen as a plea for the enforceability 
of commitment [in marriage]; an attempt to fill the gaps in public law 
with private institutions.‖91 As Rasmusen and Stake see it, now that 
―those desiring traditional relationships cannot count on the law to 
support their expectations,‖ the need for aid in enforcing their marital 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Levmore, supra note 2, at 244. 
 91. Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing 
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 464 (1998). 
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bargains may have ―driven otherwise irreligious individuals to 
organized religions that constrain individual freedom . . . to signal a 
level of commitment that the law refuses to enforce‖ because ―[a] 
church can be seen as a private organization that enforces restrictive 
rules that the law refuses to enforce.‖92 
Judge Schwelb is right that a summary or excerpts do not convey 
the full restrictive flavor of the Spires‘ Marital Agreement, but it is 
worth noting in this context that its approximately nine hundred 
words include not only a dozen different specific ways in which the 
wife is to submit to the husband but also a general provision in 
Paragraph 6 that the wife shall ―conduct herself in accordance with 
all scriptures in the Holy Bible applicable to marital relationships 
germane to wives and in accordance with husband‘s specific 
requests.‖93 Consistent with its general tendency to put full control in 
the hands of Mr. Spires, Paragraph 6 commands: ―Wife shall consult 
husband as to the applicability of scriptures.‖94 
An only slightly less controlling husband than Mr. Spires might 
have instead provided for an outside authority, such as a clergyman 
or religious body, whom the couple could consult in case of any 
doubt about what scripture required or more broadly about any 
dispute over any perceived breach of the agreement between them. 
Such an arbiter, unlike a civil court, would not be limited by 
constitutional prohibitions on slavery or guarantees of equal 
protection and due process. A religious arbiter might well have no 
difficulty enjoining on Mrs. Spires the full submission called for by 
the contract.
95
 Many religious bodies and individual clergy, 
mainstream and otherwise, have views about the appropriate behavior 
 
 92. Id. at 463. 
 93. Spires, 743 A.2d at 193–94. 
 94. Id. at 193. 
 95. The Southern Baptists, for example, have officially declared it to be a wife‘s duty to 
―submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her husband.‖ Comparison of 1925, 1963 
and 2000 Baptist Faith and Message, S. BAPTIST CONVENTION, http://www.sbc.net/bfm/ 
bfmcomparison.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2011). As I have discussed in other work, the timing of 
the Southern Baptists‘ inclusion of wifely submission among their official tenets is noteworthy: 
although hardly a new doctrine, it became official only after the U.S. Supreme Court had 
declared the enforcement of any such submission in state or federal law unconstitutional. See, 
e.g., Mary Anne Case, The Peculiar Stake U.S. Protestants Have in the Question of State 
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, in AFTER SECULAR LAW (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan ed., 
forthcoming 2011).  
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of husbands and wives that would be impermissible for a state or 
federal court to impose on spouses.
96
 Although not all couples would 
prefer civil court to dispute resolution by pastors, psychologists, and 
other counselors, it seems to me better that couples who would prefer 
a civil court be given that option without being required to seek a 
divorce, because the constraints that apply to civil courts do not apply 
to these other potential arbiters.  
The controversy in Ontario, Canada, arising out of a 2004 attempt 
by the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice to provide Canadian Muslims 
sharia-based binding arbitration enforceable in civil court is worth 
examining in this connection.
97
 Many participants in the controversy 
framed it as simply a problem with faith-based arbitration or even 
more narrowly with Islamic arbitration applying sharia law. For 
example, in September 2005, Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty 
insisted that ―there will be no sharia law in Ontario. There will be no 
religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one law for all 
Ontarians.‖98 But the problem presented and the ultimate legislative 
solution adopted encompassed any binding arbitration of family law 
matters enforceable in the ordinary courts, not just religious 
arbitration. Since 1991, the Arbitration Act, under which not only 
secular but also Jewish, Christian, and Muslim groups formed and 
operated arbitral boards, apparently had allowed for legally binding 
arbitration of family and business matters without any ―institutional 
oversight mechanism to ensure that decisions were in compliance 
with Canadian law.‖99 As a result of the controversy, the law was 
amended February 14, 2006, to provide that ―enforceable decisions 
must be consistent with the provincial family law regime,‖ including 
 
 96. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wang, 896 P.2d 450, 454 (Mont. 1995) (Leaphart, J., 
dissenting) (discussing church practice of subjecting a wife to exorcism ―to rid herself of the 
‗evil unsubmissive spirits‘—the spirits which caused her to speak up for herself and to exercise 
authority rather than completely submit to her husband‖). For further discussion, see Mary 
Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between Government and Family 
Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 381. 
 97. For a brief summary of the major events and issues in this controversy, see Anne 
Korteweg, The Sharia Debate in Ontario, 18 ISIM REV. 50 (2006). For a longer exploration of 
the issues and constituencies involved, see, for example, Beverley Baines, Must Feminists 
Identify as Secular Citizens? Lessons From Ontario, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF 
WOMEN‘S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 83 (Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009). 
 98. Baines, supra note 97, at 85. 
 99. Korteweg, supra note 97, at 50. 
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applicable constitutional guarantees such as the equality of the 
sexes.
100
 Some of those who opposed this change insisted that 
Muslim women would still ―turn (or be turned) to informal sharia 
based-arbitration without any protection by the state.‖101 From what I 
know of it, however, the 2007 amendment is an improvement over a 
regime in which there was not only no protection from the state but 
also a risk that the state itself would enforce against such women 
arbitral decisions that systematically and grossly devalued women‘s 
rights.  
AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADJUDICATE DISPUTES IN AN ONGOING 
MARRIAGE MAY BE PARTICULARLY BENEFICIAL TO COUPLES 
WHOSE MARITAL BARGAINS DEPART FROM TRADITIONAL GENDER 
ROLE EXPECTATIONS 
In his Comment on this Essay, economist Robert Pollak argues 
that while ―[e]conomic models of bargaining in marriage‖ lead to the 
conclusion that judicial willingness to enforce at least some bargains 
between spouses in ongoing marriages would ―be superior to the . . . 
‗love-it-or-leave-it‘ rule,‖ these models also ―suggest that the 
magnitude of the improvement would be relatively small.‖102 In 
conversation, Pollak acknowledged that he premised his claim about 
the small magnitude of predicted improvement on an assumption that 
overall only a small minority of couples would likely take advantage 
of the opportunities offered by judicial enforcement. For couples in 
that small minority, however, he readily admitted that the magnitude 
of the improvement could be quite large.  
As Pollak notes, I share his intuition that because of ―three factors 
ignored in the simple [two-stage bargaining] model: the costs of legal 
enforcement, the nature of relational contracts, and the reluctance of 
family members to make explicit bargains with one another,‖103 few 
couples in ongoing marriages ―would resort to the courts.‖104 The 
 
 100. Baines, supra note 97, at 96. 
 101. Korteweg, supra note 97, at 50. 
 102. Robert A. Pollak, Comment on Mary Anne Case’s Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing 
Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 261, 261 (2011). 
 103. Id. at 272. 
 104. Id. at 270. 
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small number of likely litigated cases does not seem to me to cut in 
favor of closing the courts to such couples, however. Indeed, given 
that the danger of overburdening courts with numerous trivial or 
burdensome spousal claims is frequently raised as an objection to 
entertaining the possibility of any judicial enforcement of bargains in 
an ongoing marriage, the small number may cut in the proposal‘s 
favor. Moreover, only a very small percentage of parties to most 
ongoing transactions (indeed, even to transactions no longer ongoing) 
resort to the courts. This does not make the possibility of judicial 
enforcement unhelpful or irrelevant to all but the small percentage 
who seek it, however. As documented in an extensive literature on 
―bargaining in the shadow of the law‖—a concept not coincidentally 
first given its name in an article on the resolution of disputes between 
divorcing spouses—―the particular allocation a court will impose if 
the parties fail to reach agreement‖ creates bargaining endowments 
that are a major factor in shaping the contours of the agreements 
reached and abided by even by parties who never seek judicial 
resolution of disputed questions.
105 
As discussed above, in the past, the absence of any possibility of 
judicial enforcement of bargains in an ongoing marriage created 
bargaining endowments that tended to benefit the patriarchal 
husband.
106
 At present, as Pollak‘s own innovative prior work 
modeling bargains in marriage suggests and as I will explore in 
further detail below, increasing the possibility of judicial enforcement 
for bargains in an ongoing marriage may be more likely to create 
bargaining endowments that tend to benefit those in couples who 
have reached and seek enforcement of a bargain that departs from 
traditional gender roles. 
If I am right that the couples who could most benefit from a 
retreat from a love-it-or-leave-it regime for marriage are likely to be 
thus doubly exceptional—exceptional not only in their willingness to 
make explicit bargains but also in the extent to which those bargains 
 
 105. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 966 (1979). 
 106. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; Robert A. Pollak, Tied Transfers and 
Paternalistic Preferences, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 242–43 (1988) (analyzing Gary Becker‘s 
model of decision making in the family as an ultimatum game in which the ―husband-father-
dictator-patriarch‖ can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to other family members). 
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embody a departure from traditional sex role differentiation in 
marriage—then my support for making a space for them in the law is 
strengthened by my longstanding commitments as a feminist theorist. 
Much of my prior work in feminist theory has focused on the need to 
make space for the exceptional man or woman.
107
 And, although my 
analysis here is not constitutional, I am inspired to emphasize the 
potential beneficial effects of law reform on outliers by the centrality 
of exceptional husbands and wives to so much of the U.S. 
constitutional law of sex and gender.
108 
What support is there for the claim that excluding the possibility 
of judicial enforcement of bargains in an ongoing marriage is 
disproportionately likely to disadvantage those whose bargains depart 
from traditional sex roles? Consider what Pollak himself concluded 
in earlier pioneering work on marital bargaining. With Shelly 
Lundberg, Pollak developed a cooperative Nash bargaining model for 
marriage dubbed ―separate spheres,‖ in which the default outcome is 
 
 107. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: 
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 105 (1995) (―In 
arguing that the treatment of the exceptional effeminate man teaches us much, . . . I hope to 
have shown how, once again, the margins can illuminate the center; and to have taken steps to 
make the world safe for us all, norms and exceptions, men and women, masculine and feminine, 
and every shade in between.‖).  
 108. Ruth Bader Ginsburg famously litigated many precedent-setting constitutional sex 
discrimination cases on behalf of husbands and wives who were exceptions to traditional sex 
roles.  See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (female military personnel); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (male primary caregiver for infant); Mary 
Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law 
as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1448–49 (2000) (analyzing the role 
of exceptions to stereotypes in constitutional sex discrimination law). And in the abortion case 
of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the majority, urged to let stand a requirement of spousal 
notification because ―it imposes almost no burden at all for the vast majority of women seeking 
abortion,‖ responded: 
The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute 
operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution 
by its impact on those whose conduct it affects. For example, we would not say that a 
law which requires a newspaper to print a candidate‘s reply to an unfavorable editorial 
is valid on its face because most newspapers would adopt the policy even absent the 
law. The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a 
restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant. 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (citation omitted).  
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―not divorce, but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage‖ that 
reflects gender norms.
109 
According to Pollak and Lundberg: 
The separate spheres model differs from the divorce threat 
model in two ways. First, the threat point is not divorce but a 
noncooperative equilibrium defined in terms of traditional 
gender roles and gender role expectations. Second, the 
noncooperative equilibrium, although it is not Pareto optimal, 
may be the final equilibrium because of the presence of 
transaction costs.
110 
They explained: 
[I]n realistic social contexts, conventional modes of behavior 
may suggest a ―focal-point equilibrium,‖ thus reducing or 
eliminating the need for pre-play negotiations or providing a 
way of predicting their outcome. In the case of marriage, social 
conventions regarding the responsibilities of husbands and 
wives may indeed suggest to the spouses a particular 
equilibrium. 
. . . .
 
. . . The separate-spheres bargaining model provides an 
obvious example: if some household public goods are regarded 
as within the wife‘s sphere and others as within the husband‘s 
sphere, then a reasonable focal-point equilibrium may consist 
of complete gender specialization in the provision of 
household public goods corresponding to this conventional 
gender assignment of responsibilities.
111 
What Pollak‘s analysis predicts is exactly what I am afraid of—not 
only do husband and wife begin with social conventions that suggest 
a focal point equilibrium in line with conventional gender roles, if 
they fail to agree or fail to abide by an agreement to diverge from 
conventional gender roles and there is no possibility of obtaining 
 
 109. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage 
Market, 101 J. POL. ECON. 988, 990 (1993). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining Models of 
Marriage, AM. ECON. REV., May 1994, at 132, 134–36 (1994). 
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judicial enforcement of an agreement to diverge from such roles, the 
likely outcome, short of divorce, is ―a noncooperative equilibrium 
defined in terms of traditional gender roles and gender role 
expectations.‖112 
Pollak‘s Comment stresses that an economist‘s ―simple two-stage 
model‖ of bargaining in marriage will exaggerate the efficiency 
advantages of the possibility of judicial enforcement of bargains in an 
ongoing marriage to the extent such a model ignores ―three 
mechanisms [apart from judicial enforcement] that, in some cases, 
would enable spouses to make binding agreements: internalized 
norms, self-help, and non-legal third-party enforcement.‖113 Pollak 
correctly notes: ―‗Norms‘ are an elastic notion, often encompassing 
both obligations enforced by the prospect of internal sanctions (e.g., 
you will feel guilty) and external sanctions (e.g., if you mistreat your 
wife, you will be beaten by her brothers and ostracized by the 
community).‖114 
What Pollak fails to note in his Comment, however, is the 
disproportionate way both internal and external gender norms are 
likely to operate on an untraditional bargain between spouses. 
Because spouses who bargain for an unconventional division of roles 
are overwhelmingly likely to have been exposed to socialization in 
conventional gender roles, any internalized guilt a husband may feel 
at failing to live up fully to his unconventional bargain may be 
counteracted by his sense that he is already doing more than his 
father and other husbands around him have done. Unless their 
community is as unconventional as the spouses‘ unconventional 
bargain, the community may be more likely to ostracize his wife for 
demanding so much more of him than is customary than it is to 
support her in her demand that he live up to his bargain. The 
community may ostracize him more for agreeing to such a bargain in 
the first place than for failing to live up to it. It is also touchingly 
optimistic of Pollak to assume that ―if you mistreat your wife, you 
will be beaten by her brothers.‖115 The brothers may instead have a 
 
 112. Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 109, at 990. 
 113. Pollak, supra note 102, at 271. 
 114. Id. at 268 n.51. 
 115. Id.  
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direct personal stake in supporting a husband who fails to live up to 
an unconventional bargain over the wife who could use their help in 
enforcing it against him extrajudicially: the brothers may not want to 
give their own wives any ideas about renegotiating their own 
household bargains along less conventional lines less advantageous to 
the brothers. (Note that while my examples presume that the party 
more likely to need help enforcing a bargain that departs from 
conventional gender role expectations is the wife, similar arguments 
would apply, for example, to the case of a husband seeking to hold 
his wife to a bargain that she support his exit from the labor force to 
be the primary caregiver of their children.)
116 
As for other forms of non-legal third party enforcement beyond 
family and community pressure, as discussed above, there is every 
reason to think that the most likely sources of such enforcement—
notably religious organizations, clergy and other counselors—are also 
likely to favor traditional gender roles over the untraditional. Judges, 
too, are socialized in and may be sympathetic to conventional gender 
roles, but they are also socialized into interpreting and enforcing 
agreements and are legally bound as well as socialized into 
complying in their enforcement decisions with constitutional norms 
of sex equality and due process. For these reasons I would predict 
that, just as repressively traditional bargains such as the Spires 
marital agreement will do worse with judges than with those most 
likely to offer non-legal third party enforcement, untraditional 
bargains may well do better.  
BARGAINING AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF BARGAINS IN THE 
ONGOING MARRIAGE OF BARACK AND MICHELLE OBAMA 
As a supplement to the hypothetical and abstract marital bargains 
Pollak and other economists have modeled, let me end with a brief 
 
 116. It is an interesting question whether bargains such as those whose enforcement under 
Jewish law was discussed earlier, supra note 74 and accompanying text, in which a wife will 
support her husband as he studies Torah rather than have him support her as Jewish law would 
otherwise require, should be seen as bargains departing from traditional sex roles, given that 
both a husband‘s dedication to study and a wife‘s corresponding participation in market 
activities are solidly established traditions in Judaism. See, e.g., Proverbs 31:10-31 (describing 
the market and household activities of a ―woman of valor‖). 
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discussion of the relatively well-documented marital bargaining of 
one real-life couple, Barack and Michelle Obama. The repeated 
renegotiation of bargains in the Obamas‘ ongoing marriage is 
documented in a number of first person reports by each of them over 
a number of years, corroborated by third party reporting, all of which 
tells a consistent story on which the Obamas themselves agree.
117
 Of 
course, the Obamas never did and likely never would seek judicial 
assistance in enforcing their bargains for many reasons, the least of 
which is the effect such litigation would have on his political career. 
Because internalized and community norms and self-help assisted in 
facilitating the enforcement of their bargains, Pollak may see their 
case as supporting the proposition that there are effective ways short 
of offering a judicial forum to reduce the likelihood of inefficiency in 
marital bargaining. But the extraordinary advantages the Obamas 
brought to the table and the difficulties and inefficiencies they both 
concede they still suffered in their ongoing renegotiations also point 
up the limitations unconventional couples face in operating without a 
judicial backstop. Tellingly, although Pollak‘s and other economic 
models of bargaining in marriage focus on ―income or earnings‖ as 
the resources each spouse controls and divides in a bargaining game, 
for the Obamas time and energy seem to have been the scarce 
resources whose contribution to the household public good they most 
struggled over.  
It does not appear that the Obamas engaged in much explicit 
prenuptial bargaining about the division of labor or allocation of time 
in their marriage. Rather, as Barack describes it in the chapter on 
family in The Audacity of Hope, they brought to the marriage 
expectations they had grown up with—he as an only child 
accustomed to spending time alone, she as part of a close-knit nuclear 
household centered on family activities.
118
 They worked at adjusting 
to one another, and, after the birth of their first child, even found 
 
 117. Among the sources of this story are the chapter on family in BARACK OBAMA, THE 
AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM 325–52 (2006); 
interviews with and profiles of the Obamas separately and as a couple in print and broadcast 
media from the New York Times to Oprah; journalists‘ interviews with Obama family friends 
such as Valerie Jarrett; and books and documentary films reporting on the Obama campaign, 
such as RICHARD WOLFFE, RENEGADE: THE MAKING OF A PRESIDENT (2009). 
 118. OBAMA, supra note 117, at 325–52. 
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useful synergy in some of their differences; for example, that he was 
a night owl and she an early riser facilitated child care in the early 
months when both were at home to care for baby Malia.
119
 But once 
they both returned to work and he added an unsuccessful run for 
Congress to an already crowded schedule of teaching and commuting 
to the state legislature, the stresses on their time grew and Michelle‘s 
frustration at his ―suddenly . . . less endearing . . . failure to clean up 
the kitchen,‖120 led her to the form of self-help Pollak, following 
Bergstrom, calls ―harsh words and burnt toast.‖121 By the time Sasha 
was born, Barack observed:  
[M]y wife‘s anger toward me seemed barely contained. 
 ―You only think about yourself,‖ she would tell me. ―I 
never thought I‘d have to raise a family alone.‖122 
Consistent with my predictions as to the effect of internalized social 
norms on departures from gender norms, Barack‘s initial response 
was to feel aggrieved because he gave so much more and asked so 
much less than traditional male sex roles would have allowed: 
I thought she was being unfair. After all, it wasn‘t as if I went 
carousing with the boys every night. I made few demands of 
Michelle—I didn‘t expect her to darn my socks or have dinner 
waiting for me when I got home. Whenever I could, I pitched 
in with the kids. All I asked for in return was a little 
tenderness. Instead, I found myself subjected to endless 
negotiations about every detail of managing the house, long 
 
 119. Id. at 338–39. 
 120. Id. at 340. 
 121. Pollak, supra note 102, at 269 (quoting Theodore C. Bergstrom, Economics in a 
Family Way, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1903, 1926 (1996)). 
 122. OBAMA, supra note 117, at 340. Michelle Obama‘s complaints are hardly unique to 
her, or even to women with her level of education and ambition. See, e.g., SHARON HAYS, THE 
CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 98–108 (1998) (describing mothers‘ ―implicit 
resentment of‖ and their ―[s]trategies for downplaying gender inequities in child rearing,‖ given 
that, in the study‘s sample, ―[t]here is not a single household in which fathers . . . take 
responsibility for all child-rearing tasks, and men rarely take primary responsibility for any 
single child-rearing duty,‖ and ―mothers . . . , on average, spend four times the hours men do as 
the primary caregivers‖). 
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lists of things that I needed to do or had forgotten to do, and a 
generally sour attitude.
123
 
Although he wanted to see himself as ―liberated‖ and Michelle as an 
―equal partner . . . [whose] dreams and ambitions were as important 
as my own—the fact was that when children showed up, it was 
Michelle and not I who was expected to make the necessary 
adjustments.‖124 Barack reports Michelle as also internalizing some 
degree of conventional norms, feeling guilty and conflicted about her 
inability to fulfill to her own high standards her household and 
professional roles.
125
 
Applying the analysis of the relationship between status and 
contract I used for McGuire to the Obama marriage, I would argue 
that until the birth of Sasha and the failure of his congressional 
campaign, the Obamas, like the McGuires, seem to have had no 
explicit bargain or contract between them; rather, they had conflicting 
visions of what the status obligations of the husband in a marriage 
should be. From that time forward, however, they have negotiated 
and renegotiated explicit and very public bargains and had their 
compliance with those bargains monitored, as few couples can, in the 
court of public opinion.  
―Barack and I, we‘re doing a lot of talking,‖ Michelle would tell 
friends and colleagues after Malia‘s birth.126 According to Barack, 
―Michelle would say, ‗Well, you‘re gone all the time and we‘re 
broke? . . . How is that a good deal?‘‖127 His response ―to his wife‘s 
assertions that he was leaving her to raise their children alone,‖ 
according to family friend Valerie Jarrett, was ―I‘ll make it work. . . . 
We can make it work. I‘ll do more.‖128 
The Obamas had some unusual advantages in reaching a 
cooperative equilibrium, beginning with her forthrightness and his 
sense of his own shortcomings in light of his perception of the 
 
 123. OBAMA, supra note 117, at 340. 
 124. Id. at 340–41. 
 125. Id. at 341. 
 126. Jodi Kantor, The Obamas’ Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009,  § 6 (Magazine), at 
MM44. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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fairness of her demands.
129
 They did not lack for resources to ease 
their burdens, above all intangible resources such as the mother and 
close friends Michelle could turn to for some of the help with 
parenting she had expected and failed to receive from Barack.
130
 
Perhaps most intriguingly, they had an unusual alternative threat 
point in addition to the usual, such as divorce–she could withhold her 
support for his political career. Indeed, much of their explicit 
bargaining centered around the conditions under which she would 
consent to his candidacy, first for the Senate and then for the 
presidency. Before she would support his bid for the presidency, 
Michelle negotiated hard, not only with Barack but also with his team 
of advisors, to ―get over the hurdles and [be] sufficiently comfortable 
that he‘ll be available to be the father that we want him to be.‖131 As 
she had with his Senate race, she extracted the commitment that if the 
campaign were unsuccessful it would not be repeated the next time 
around. Although when he became Senator he ―wanted her to move 
to D.C. so the family could be together,‖ Michelle, having 
―reconciled herself to the fact that their home life would never be the 
same as the nuclear family she had known as a child, with a father 
who was home every night for dinner,‖ insisted on staying in Chicago 
close to her support network of friends and family.
132
 What helped 
sell her on the presidential race was the prospect that, with a less 
grueling travel schedule and the Oval Office under the same roof as 
the White House family quarters, being President would somewhat 
paradoxically allow Barack to be more present and involved in family 
life.
133
 
 
 129. Near the end of The Audacity of Hope, for example, Barack admits that his ―recent 
success in politics does little to assuage the guilt‖ of not being there for his family, so he does 
his ―best to answer the accusation that floats around in my mind—that I am selfish, that I do 
what I do to feed my own ego‖ by participating as an active parent to the fullest extent his travel 
schedule permits.  OBAMA, supra note 117, at 348. 
 130. Michelle acknowledged to reporter Jodi Kantor in 2007 that she had ―want[ed] a 
certain type of model, and our lives didn‘t fit that model. . . . I just needed the support. It didn‘t 
have to be Barack.‖ Kantor, supra note 126. 
 131. WOLFFE, supra note 117, at 54. 
 132. Id. at 52. 
 133. See, e.g., Kantor, supra note 126 (―‗This is the first time in a long time in our marriage 
that we‘ve lived seven days a week in the same household with the same schedule, with the 
same set of rituals,‘ Michelle Obama pointed out. . . . ‗That‘s been more of a relief for me than I 
would have ever imagined.‘‖). 
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I wish I could see the Obamas‘ story as a triumph of extralegal 
enforcement for an untraditional marital bargain in an ongoing 
marriage. But the court of public opinion, far from supporting 
Michelle, faulted her for nagging him.
134
 Even with her extraordinary 
strength of purpose and his extraordinary willingness to try to do 
right by her on the terms she set, what they have ended up with is an 
equilibrium fairly close to that predicted by Lundberg and Pollak‘s 
separate spheres model, an equilibrium defined rather more in terms 
of traditional gender roles and gender role expectations than either of 
the Obamas have said they would prefer, one in which, as Barack 
recounts somewhat wistfully: 
It is left to Michelle to coordinate all the children‘s activities, 
which she does with a general‘s efficiency. When I can, I 
volunteer to help, which Michelle appreciates, although she is 
careful to limit my responsibilities. . . .  
. . .  
In all [my efforts at participation in the children‘s lives] I am 
encouraged by Michelle, although there are times when I get 
the sense that I‘m encroaching on her space—that by my 
absences I may have forfeited certain rights to interfere in the 
world she has built.
135
 
 
 134. See, e.g., Andrew Lynch, Too Feisty for First Lady?, SUNDAY BUS. POST, Feb. 24, 
2008, http://www.sbpost.ie/archives/2008/0224/too-feisty-for-first-lady-30670.html (―At the 
start of the presidential campaign, she undermined his saintly image by calling him a domestic 
slob who never picks up his dirty socks or puts the butter back in the fridge.‖). 
 135. OBAMA, supra note 117, at 349–52. 
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